The authors thank Professors Joseph Harrington Jr., Jaehong Kim, Oliver Williamson, Keith Wong, and two referees for helpful comments. They are grateful for financial support by a grant from the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong (HKUST6211/97H).
TRIGGER-POINT MECHANISM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENTRY, COLLUSION, AND WELFARE
Version of Record online: 24 JAN 2007
No Claim to Original U.S. Government Works
Contemporary Economic Policy
Volume 25, Issue 2, pages 156–169, April 2007
How to Cite
QIU, L. D., CHENG, L. K. and FUNG, M. K. (2007), TRIGGER-POINT MECHANISM AND CONDITIONAL COMMITMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENTRY, COLLUSION, AND WELFARE. Contemporary Economic Policy, 25: 156–169. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2006.00028.x
- Issue online: 24 JAN 2007
- Version of Record online: 24 JAN 2007
- Advance Access publication March 8, 2006
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