KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS AND THE SHORTAGE OF DONORS: IS A MARKET THE ANSWER?

Authors

  • ALISON J. WELLINGTON,

    1. Wellington: Associate Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, The College of Wooster, Wooster, OH, 44691. E-mail: awellington@wooster.edu
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      This research is based on and extends Justin B. Whitmire’s Senior Independent Study Thesis. Funding for this project was provided by the Henry J. Copeland Fund for Independent Study at The College of Wooster. The authors would like to thank David Kaserman, Andrew Gill, and two anonymous referees for their comments, as well as Mohammad Siddiqui and Mihika Chatterjee for research assistance.

  • JUSTIN B. WHITMIRE

    1. Whitmire: BA, The College of Wooster, Wooster, OH. E-mail: justin@whitmire.com
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    • *

      This research is based on and extends Justin B. Whitmire’s Senior Independent Study Thesis. Funding for this project was provided by the Henry J. Copeland Fund for Independent Study at The College of Wooster. The authors would like to thank David Kaserman, Andrew Gill, and two anonymous referees for their comments, as well as Mohammad Siddiqui and Mihika Chatterjee for research assistance.


Abstract

This article examines the problem of kidney shortages for transplant in the United States. Following a study by Kaserman and Barnett, we reexamine the viability of allowing a market for cadaveric kidneys and estimate the implied equilibrium price based on our survey responses. In sharp contrast to the findings of Kaserman and Barnett, we estimate that a market equilibrium price for cadaveric kidneys may be prohibitively high. Consequently, we support other policy alternatives to increase supply, particularly presumed consent and mandated choice. Our findings also highlight the importance of obtaining data through experiments, rather than a survey, to estimate the impact of financial incentives. (JEL I18, I12, I00)

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