This research is based on and extends Justin B. Whitmire’s Senior Independent Study Thesis. Funding for this project was provided by the Henry J. Copeland Fund for Independent Study at The College of Wooster. The authors would like to thank David Kaserman, Andrew Gill, and two anonymous referees for their comments, as well as Mohammad Siddiqui and Mihika Chatterjee for research assistance.
KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS AND THE SHORTAGE OF DONORS: IS A MARKET THE ANSWER?
Version of Record online: 24 JAN 2007
Contemporary Economic Policy
Volume 25, Issue 2, pages 131–145, April 2007
How to Cite
WELLINGTON, A. J. and WHITMIRE, J. B. (2007), KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS AND THE SHORTAGE OF DONORS: IS A MARKET THE ANSWER?. Contemporary Economic Policy, 25: 131–145. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2007.00035.x
- Issue online: 24 JAN 2007
- Version of Record online: 24 JAN 2007
- Online Early publication January 24, 2007
This article examines the problem of kidney shortages for transplant in the United States. Following a study by Kaserman and Barnett, we reexamine the viability of allowing a market for cadaveric kidneys and estimate the implied equilibrium price based on our survey responses. In sharp contrast to the findings of Kaserman and Barnett, we estimate that a market equilibrium price for cadaveric kidneys may be prohibitively high. Consequently, we support other policy alternatives to increase supply, particularly presumed consent and mandated choice. Our findings also highlight the importance of obtaining data through experiments, rather than a survey, to estimate the impact of financial incentives. (JEL I18, I12, I00)