STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: SOCIETAL OBJECTIVES AND THE CORPORATE WELFARE ARGUMENT

Authors

  • RICHARD T. GRETZ,

    1. Gretz: Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Bradley University, Peoria, IL, 61625. Phone (309) 677-2298; Fax (309) 677-3374; E-mail rgretz@bradley.edu
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      The authors thank the editor, two anonymous referees, and Patricia Webber for their many insightful suggestions.

  • JANNETT HIGHFILL,

    1. Highfill: Professor, Department of Economics, Bradley University, Peoria, IL, 61625. Phone (309) 677-2304; Fax (309) 677-3374; E-mail highfill@bradley.edu
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      The authors thank the editor, two anonymous referees, and Patricia Webber for their many insightful suggestions.

  • ROBERT C. SCOTT

    1. Scott: Professor, Department of Economics, Bradley University, Peoria, IL, 61625. Phone (309) 677-22974; Fax (309) 677-3374; rcs@bradley.edu
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    • *

      The authors thank the editor, two anonymous referees, and Patricia Webber for their many insightful suggestions.


Abstract

The article considers the optimal research and development subsidy regime in a two-firm two-country model where each firm is “located” in a specific country. Trade is intra-industry in that customers in both countries purchase from both firms. The article suggests that when both countries subsidize their local firm usually welfare increases compared to the case of zero subsidies. Making the same comparison, profit always falls in the symmetric game and falls about half the time in the asymmetric game. These results call into question some common notions about corporate welfare. (JEL O38, H25, F23)

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