MARKET DISCIPLINING OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS

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Abstract

In this article, we contribute to the current literature on market disciplining of the sovereign governments of the developing countries by distinguishing both sides of the market discipline hypothesis by adopting three-stage least square estimation to incorporate the contemporaneous feedback effects between primary structural budget balances and the country's default-risk premiums. We provide empirical evidence of a unidirectional causal relationship between a country's default-risk premium and primary structural budget balances with the direction flowing from primary structural budget balances to country's risk premium in 40 developing countries over the period 1975–2008. We also employ the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel generalized methods of moments estimation to control for this joint determination of primary structural budget balances and the country's default-risk premium, and find supportive evidence of undisciplined sovereign governments and of nonlinearly behaving well-functioning financial markets in the sample countries. (JEL C5, G1, G3)

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