I am grateful to the Russell Sage Foundation for a small grant in Behaveoral Economecs, which funded this project. I would like to thank Nancy Buchan, Rachel Croson, Chis hanes, David Hemenway, and David Neumark for help and advice.
Gender differences in the ultimatum game
Article first published online: 26 MAR 2007
Volume 39, Issue 2, pages 189–200, April 2001
How to Cite
Solnick, S. (2001), Gender differences in the ultimatum game. Economic Inquiry, 39: 189–200. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00060.x
- Issue published online: 26 MAR 2007
- Article first published online: 26 MAR 2007
I explore the behavior of men and women in the ultimatum game. In one treatment, players remain mutually anonymous. In the second treatment, players’gender is common knowledge. Average offers made do not differ based on the gender of player 1. Offers are affected by the gender of player 2, with men attracting higher offers, particularly from female players 1. Players 2 of both genders choose a higher minimum acceptable offer when facing a female player 1. These patterns led to substantial differences in earnings. Such striking differences in expectations and decisions could impact salary negotiations and other real-world transactions.