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CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION: A NOTE

Authors

  • CHARLES T CARLSTROM,

    1. Carlstrom: Senior Economic Advisor, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, PO Box 6387, Cleveland, OH 44101. Phone 216-579-2294, Fax 216-579-3050, E-mail charles.t.carlstrom@clev.frb.org
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      We have received helpful comments from Dandan Liu and Matthias Paustian. Any remaining errors are our own.

  • TIMOTHY S FUERST

    1. Fuerst: Professor, Department of Economics, College of Business, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403. Phone 419-372-6868, Fax 419-372-2875, E-mail tfuerst@bgsu.edu, and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Cleveland, OH 44101.
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      We have received helpful comments from Dandan Liu and Matthias Paustian. Any remaining errors are our own.


Abstract

We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two-thirds of the improved inflation performance of these nations over the past two decades. (JEL E42, E58)

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