THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF CONCESSION

Authors

  • JACK HIRSHLEIFER,

    1. Hirshleifer: Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles. (deceased)
    Search for more papers by this author
    • *

      We would like to thank National Science Foundation Grants SES-03-14713 and SES-01-0114147 for financial support. The original draft of this article together with the substantive results was prepared by all three authors. The current draft was prepared after Jack’s death on July 26, 2005, and we took the liberty of highlighting Jack’s earlier contributions to this literature.

  • MICHELE BOLDRIN,

    1. Boldrin: Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, 1 Brookings Dr., St. Louis, MO, 63130. Phone 314 935 9529; Fax 314 935 4156, E-mail michelboldrin@gmail.com
    Search for more papers by this author
    • *

      We would like to thank National Science Foundation Grants SES-03-14713 and SES-01-0114147 for financial support. The original draft of this article together with the substantive results was prepared by all three authors. The current draft was prepared after Jack’s death on July 26, 2005, and we took the liberty of highlighting Jack’s earlier contributions to this literature.

  • DAVID K LEVINE

    1. Levine: Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, 1 Brookings Dr., St. Louis, MO, 63130. Phone 314 935 9529; Fax 314 935 4156, E-mail david@dklevine.com
    Search for more papers by this author
    • *

      We would like to thank National Science Foundation Grants SES-03-14713 and SES-01-0114147 for financial support. The original draft of this article together with the substantive results was prepared by all three authors. The current draft was prepared after Jack’s death on July 26, 2005, and we took the liberty of highlighting Jack’s earlier contributions to this literature.


Abstract

We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of time preference, the potential loser can always avoid wasteful conflict through a time-consistent series of small concessions. We examine how the failure of each of these assumptions may explain why conflicts arise. We also debate which actions may be helpful in such unfortunate circumstances.

Ancillary