We would like to thank National Science Foundation Grants SES-03-14713 and SES-01-0114147 for financial support. The original draft of this article together with the substantive results was prepared by all three authors. The current draft was prepared after Jack’s death on July 26, 2005, and we took the liberty of highlighting Jack’s earlier contributions to this literature.
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THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF CONCESSION
Article first published online: 8 JUL 2008
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00154.x
© 2008 Western Economic Association International
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How to Cite
HIRSHLEIFER, J., BOLDRIN, M. and LEVINE, D. K. (2009), THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF CONCESSION. Economic Inquiry, 47: 197–205. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00154.x
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We would like to thank National Science Foundation Grants SES-03-14713 and SES-01-0114147 for financial support. The original draft of this article together with the substantive results was prepared by all three authors. The current draft was prepared after Jack’s death on July 26, 2005, and we took the liberty of highlighting Jack’s earlier contributions to this literature.
Publication History
- Issue published online: 23 APR 2009
- Article first published online: 8 JUL 2008
- Online Early publication July 8, 2008
- Abstract
- Article
- References
- Cited By
We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of time preference, the potential loser can always avoid wasteful conflict through a time-consistent series of small concessions. We examine how the failure of each of these assumptions may explain why conflicts arise. We also debate which actions may be helpful in such unfortunate circumstances.