We thank an anonymous referee, Yan Chen as the responsible editor, Theo Offerman, Jan Potters, Peter P. Wakker, Richard Zeckhauser, and seminar participants at the Decision and Uncertainty Workshop 2007, the ESA World Meeting 2007, FUR 2008, IMEBE 2008, GTS 2008, Colorado State University, the Dutch Central Bank, the University of Innsbruck, the University of Ulm, and the ENABLE symposium 2008 in Amsterdam for helpful suggestions. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the ENABLE Project under the European Union 6th Framework Program. The paper reflects the views of the authors, and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained herein.
SELECTION INTO AUCTIONS FOR RISKY AND AMBIGUOUS PROSPECTS
Version of Record online: 15 DEC 2010
© 2010 Western Economic Association International
Volume 51, Issue 1, pages 882–895, January 2013
How to Cite
KOCHER, M. G. and TRAUTMANN, S. T. (2013), SELECTION INTO AUCTIONS FOR RISKY AND AMBIGUOUS PROSPECTS. Economic Inquiry, 51: 882–895. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00347.x
- Issue online: 29 NOV 2012
- Version of Record online: 15 DEC 2010
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:
APPENDIX S1: Experimental instructions.
|ECIN_347_sm_appendixS1.doc||40K||Supporting info item|
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