S.H.O. and A.I. are supported in part by Grants-in-Aid of Scientific Research (#17310029 and #17700155) and by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and Technology (Japan). N.F. acknowledges support from the University of Aberdeen Business School. We thank Alexander Elbittar, Yasuyo Hamaguchi, Andreas Ortmann, Anmol Ratan, John Van Huyck, Nathaniel Wilcox, Erte Xiao, and participants at several conferences and seminars for helpful suggestions and comments. We give special thanks to two anonymous referees, whose comments have improved this paper substantially. Any remaining errors are the authors'.
PAYOFF LEVELS, LOSS AVOIDANCE, AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Article first published online: 22 JUL 2011
© 2011 Western Economic Association International
Volume 50, Issue 4, pages 932–952, October 2012
How to Cite
FELTOVICH, N., IWASAKI, A. and ODA, S. H. (2012), PAYOFF LEVELS, LOSS AVOIDANCE, AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY. Economic Inquiry, 50: 932–952. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00406.x
- Issue published online: 4 OCT 2012
- Article first published online: 22 JUL 2011
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