We thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments as well as Daniel Cohen, Xavier Ragot and all participants at the PSE macroeconomic tea-break (2008), at the Journées Louis André Gérard-Varet (2008) and at the annual Public Economic Theory Conference (2009).
WHY DO GOVERNMENTS END UP WITH DEBT? SHORT-RUN EFFECTS MATTER
Version of Record online: 21 SEP 2011
© 2011 Western Economic Association International
Volume 50, Issue 4, pages 905–919, October 2012
How to Cite
DESBONNET, A. and WEITZENBLUM, T. (2012), WHY DO GOVERNMENTS END UP WITH DEBT? SHORT-RUN EFFECTS MATTER. Economic Inquiry, 50: 905–919. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00410.x
- Issue online: 4 OCT 2012
- Version of Record online: 21 SEP 2011
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