We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of two anonymous referees.
CAN SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM THREATS FOSTER COOPERATION? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF FINITE-HORIZON FOLK THEOREMS
Article first published online: 23 SEP 2011
© 2011 Western Economic Association International
Volume 51, Issue 2, pages 1345–1356, April 2013
How to Cite
ANGELOVA, V., BRUTTEL, L. V., GÜTH, W. and KAMECKE, U. (2013), CAN SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM THREATS FOSTER COOPERATION? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF FINITE-HORIZON FOLK THEOREMS. Economic Inquiry, 51: 1345–1356. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00421.x
- Issue published online: 26 FEB 2013
- Article first published online: 23 SEP 2011
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