The authors would like to thank Santiago Pinto, Russell Sobel, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and West Virginia University's Ken and Randy Kendrick Fund for Free Market Research for support for data gathering. The authors alone are responsible for the contents of the paper. Upon request, the authors will provide the family relationship data, as well as all other data and a complete list of sources.
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DYNASTIC POLITICAL PRIVILEGE AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CASE OF U.S. GOVERNORS, 1950–2005
Article first published online: 2 JUL 2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00476.x
© 2012 Western Economic Association International
Additional Information
How to Cite
CROWLEY, G. R. and REECE, W. S. (2013), DYNASTIC POLITICAL PRIVILEGE AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CASE OF U.S. GOVERNORS, 1950–2005. Economic Inquiry, 51: 735–746. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00476.x
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The authors would like to thank Santiago Pinto, Russell Sobel, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and West Virginia University's Ken and Randy Kendrick Fund for Free Market Research for support for data gathering. The authors alone are responsible for the contents of the paper. Upon request, the authors will provide the family relationship data, as well as all other data and a complete list of sources.
Publication History
- Issue published online: 29 NOV 2012
- Article first published online: 2 JUL 2012
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