The authors would like to thank Robert Faff (editor), an anonymous referee, Cheong H. Yi, and participants of research workshop at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University for their useful comments. We also thank Mr Alvis Lo for his assistance in hand-collecting ownership and board data. Peter Cheng acknowledges the financial support from the Area of Strategic Development (ASD) in China Business Services at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Grant No. A614. All errors are our own.
Managerial ownership, board monitoring and firm performance in a family-concentrated corporate environment
Article first published online: 28 SEP 2011
© 2011 The Authors. Accounting and Finance © 2011 AFAANZ
Accounting & Finance
Volume 52, Issue 4, pages 1061–1081, December 2012
How to Cite
Cheng, P., Su, L. and Zhu, X. (2012), Managerial ownership, board monitoring and firm performance in a family-concentrated corporate environment. Accounting & Finance, 52: 1061–1081. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00448.x
- Issue published online: 13 DEC 2012
- Article first published online: 28 SEP 2011
- Received 9 November 2010; accepted 13 September 2011 by Robert Faff (Editor).
- Board of directors;
- Family concentration;
- Firm performance;
- Managerial compensation;
- Managerial ownership
Using data from Hong Kong, a market that has family-concentrated ownership structure, we examine the relation between managerial ownership, the board of directors and firm performance. We first conduct analysis on the managerial ownership and firm performance to derive the turning points where either ‘convergence of interest’ or ‘entrenchment’ effect of managerial ownership is dominant. Based on these estimated turning points, we find that at low and high level of ownership, effective board mitigates the entrenchment effect associated with managerial ownership; at medium level of ownership, board effectiveness is less demanded. These findings suggest that managerial ownership and board monitoring are substitutes in mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders. We also find that effective board curbs the excessive compensation by entrenched managers to themselves at low level of managerial ownership.