The author would like to thank his colleagues Professor Robert Durand at Curtin University and Professor Richard Heaney at the University of Western Australia for their invaluable comments and feedback. The author would also like to thank his colleagues in Accounting and Finance Discipline Group at the University of Western Australia for their comments and feedback. The initial draft of this paper won the best paper award in the corporate governance stream at the 2010 AFAANZ Conference in Christchurch, New Zealand. I would like to thank my paper reviewer(s) who nominated this paper for the best paper award. I would also like to thank my paper discussant, Associate Professor Keith Duncan from Bond University, and all participants at the 2010 AFAANZ Conference for their comments and feedback. Thanks are also due to Professor Ender Demir and all participants at the 2010 EBES Conference for their feedback and suggestions. I am also thankful to all participants at the UWA Business School Forum for their comments and feedback. Many thanks also to Professor Terry Walter, Dr Dirk Baur and all participants at September 2010 seminars at the University of Technology-Sydney for their comments and suggestions. All errors are mine.
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Leverage, executive incentives and corporate governance
Article first published online: 25 OCT 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00450.x
© 2011 The Author. Accounting and Finance © 2011 AFAANZ
Additional Information
How to Cite
Agha, M. (2013), Leverage, executive incentives and corporate governance. Accounting & Finance, 53: 1–30. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00450.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 15 MAR 2013
- Article first published online: 25 OCT 2011
- Received 11 February 2011; accepted 3 October 2011 by Robert Faff (Editor).
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