*An earlier version of this paper was delivered as the J.-J. Laffont Lecture at the 2008 CRESSE Conference. I am indebted for useful comments to Anne Layne-Farrar, Damien Geradin, Patrick Rey, David Ulph and, especially, the Editor and two unusually thoughtful referees. Remaining flaws in this essay are of course entirely my responsibility.
STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY*
Article first published online: 27 AUG 2009
© 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics
The Journal of Industrial Economics
Special Issue: CRESSE SYMPOSIUM ON COMPETITION POLICY: PROCEDURES, INSTITUTIONS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS Edited by Yannis Katsoulacos and David Ulph
Volume 57, Issue 3, pages 526–552, September 2009
How to Cite
SCHMALENSEE, R. (2009), STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 57: 526–552. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00388.x
- Issue published online: 27 AUG 2009
- Article first published online: 27 AUG 2009
Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard-setting organizations (SSO's). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent-holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSO's should not be required to conduct auctions among patent-holders before standards are set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed.