*I thank the Editor, anonymous referees and Jacques Crémer for helpful comments and suggestions. I bear sole responsibility for any remaining errors.
OPTIMAL AUCTIONS WHEN A SELLER IS BOUND TO SELL TO COLLUSIVE BIDDERS*
Article first published online: 24 NOV 2009
© 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics
The Journal of Industrial Economics
Volume 57, Issue 4, pages 835–850, December 2009
How to Cite
GRUYER, N. (2009), OPTIMAL AUCTIONS WHEN A SELLER IS BOUND TO SELL TO COLLUSIVE BIDDERS. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 57: 835–850. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00397.x
- Issue published online: 24 NOV 2009
- Article first published online: 24 NOV 2009
Options for accessing this content:
- If you have access to this content through a society membership, please first log in to your society website.
- If you would like institutional access to this content, please recommend the title to your librarian.
- Login via other institutional login options http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/login-options.
- You can purchase online access to this Article for a 24-hour period (price varies by title)
- New Users: Please register, then proceed to purchase the article.
Registered Users please login:
- Access your saved publications, articles and searches
- Manage your email alerts, orders and subscriptions
- Change your contact information, including your password
Please register to:
- Save publications, articles and searches
- Get email alerts
- Get all the benefits mentioned below!