In their respective attempts to identify the “critical flaws” in Lamiell, Foss, Trierweiler, and Leffel's research on the role of dialectical reasoning in intuitive personology, both Conger and Woody (1983; see preceding articles) err by obscuring a crucial distinction between judgments, which are mental phenomena, and ratings, which are behavioral phenomena. By elaborating this distinction in the present article, we explain, among other things, the following: (1) Contrary to Woody's claim, Lamiell et al.'s formal representation of dialectical reasoning via interactive measurement is neither equivalent to nor reducible to Anderson's weighted averaging model of impression formation. (2) Contrary to Conger's claim, Lamiell et al.'s formal representations of demonstrative reasoning in terms of the normal-curve equivalents of z-scores did not bias their results against the normative or ipsative models, and in fact presented those models more favorably and in a manner more consistent with the extant empirical literature on rating behavior than does the alternative Conger proposes. (3) The profile dissimilarity analyses reported by Lamiell et al. were entirely adequate for their purposes. It is concluded that Lamiell et al.'s findings stand as billed: preliminary evidence for the dialectical quality of subjective personality impressions.