The authors would like to thank William Kurtines for his helpful suggestions on this commentary.
Moral Questions and Amoral Answers: Who Decides?
Article first published online: 28 APR 2006
Journal of Personality
Volume 62, Issue 2, pages 269–272, June 1994
How to Cite
Quinn, R. A., Houts, A. C. and Graesser, A. C. (1994), Moral Questions and Amoral Answers: Who Decides?. Journal of Personality, 62: 269–272. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1994.tb00295.x
- Issue published online: 28 APR 2006
- Article first published online: 28 APR 2006
- Manuscript received January 15, 1991; revised March 18, 1993.
ABSTRACT Researchers have examined moral thought using selected philosophical standards without showing that such standards represent moral thinking. Recently, we examined the extent to which assumed standards actually organize moral knowledge (Quinn, Houts, & Graesser, this issue). We found dimensions not accounted for by previous theories. In his response (this issue), Shaffer misrepresents the aims of our research, and he overlooks the implications of assessing naturalistic rather than prescribed dimensions of morality.