On the Distinction between Moral Thinking and Thinking about Morality: A Reply to Quinn, Houts, and Graesser
Article first published online: 28 APR 2006
Journal of Personality
Volume 62, Issue 2, pages 273–275, June 1994
How to Cite
Shaffer, D. R. (1994), On the Distinction between Moral Thinking and Thinking about Morality: A Reply to Quinn, Houts, and Graesser. Journal of Personality, 62: 273–275. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1994.tb00296.x
- Issue published online: 28 APR 2006
- Article first published online: 28 APR 2006
- Manuscript received January 23, 1991; revised October 12, 1993.
- Cited By
ABSTRACT Quinn, Houts, and Graesser (this issue) have misconstrued my earlier commentary, attributing several conclusions to me that I neither made nor intended. Moreover, they continue to confuse moral thinking, reasoning, and related constructs with thinking about the meaning of the term “morality.” If Quinn et al. are ever to achieve their aims of using the “question-answering” method to study naturalistic moral reasoning and/or to assess the merits of value-prescriptive theories of morality, they will have to ask questions that can indeed illustrate the underpinnings of subjects' moral thought.