Thinking about Morality and Moral Thinking: Is There a Distinction?
Version of Record online: 28 APR 2006
Journal of Personality
Volume 62, Issue 2, pages 277–279, June 1994
How to Cite
Quinn, R. A., Houts, A. C. and Graesser, A. C. (1994), Thinking about Morality and Moral Thinking: Is There a Distinction?. Journal of Personality, 62: 277–279. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1994.tb00297.x
- Issue online: 28 APR 2006
- Version of Record online: 28 APR 2006
- Manuscript received January 15, 1991; revised March 18, 1993.
ABSTRACT A recent exchange with Shaffer (this issue) reveals several points of agreement underscoring the utility of our subject-based approach to understanding moral thought. Shaffer's latest reply raises the interesting question of whether thinking about morality, the focus of our study, constitutes moral thinking. Our response underscores how Shaffer's approach to studying moral thought differs from our own. More important, we emphasize how disagreements over what constitutes moral thinking can and should be settled empirically.