Cf. Lucas (1988).
Article first published online: 18 JAN 2011
© 2011 International Institute of Social Studies
Development and Change
Volume 42, Issue 1, pages 284–296, January 2011
How to Cite
Ghose, A. K. (2011), Amit Bhanduri. Development and Change, 42: 284–296. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01674.x
- Issue published online: 14 APR 2011
- Article first published online: 18 JAN 2011
Amit Bhaduri was educated at the Universities of Calcutta (India) and Cambridge (UK), and at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (USA). He has taught at universities around the world including Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India), the Universities of Bologna and Pavia (Italy), Trondheim (Norway), Bremen (Germany), Vienna and Linz (Austria), Stanford (USA) and El Collegio de Mexico (Mexico). Currently he is Professor Emeritus at Jawaharlal Nehru University and Visiting Professor at the Council for Social Development (New Delhi, India). Amit Bhaduri is the author of many well-known books and articles (a small selection of his published works is listed below). He has been a consistent critic of mainstream neoclassical economic theory, relentlessly exposing its logically flawed foundations. He has made valuable contributions in several important fields including capital and growth theory, Keynesian and Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics and development economics. An intellectual activist, he has become a staunch critic of ‘corporate-led growth strategies’ and ‘developmental terrorism’, that have emerged in India and other developing countries in the wake of globalization. He has also been engaged in thinking through alternative development strategies that seek to mobilize the strengths and energies of the poor masses that are currently disenfranchised and excluded from the growth process.
AKG: You began your career as an economist in Cambridge (UK) in the 1960s, a time when the ‘capital controversy’ between Cambridge (UK) and Cambridge (USA) was in full swing. You were a participant in this debate and focused on the relevance of Marx's notion of capital as an instrument of capitalist accumulation. What view do you take of those issues today?
AB: Looking back, the ‘capital theory’ debate was important mainly as a learning experience for me. I came to see how you could logically demolish the foundations of a theory, and yet the theory could not just survive but continue to thrive.
A first reason for this is that vested interest in neoclassical economics was and remains much too strong. A huge intellectual industry has been built around aggregate production function in capital and labour, marginal productivity theory of distribution, estimation of total factor productivity and contribution of technical progress to growth, and so on. Academic careers are built through the publication of papers that report the results of minor manipulations of these themes, and Nobel Memorial prizes are often awarded to celebrate research conducted in this framework. It is not that economists were unaware of the devastating implications of the critique of capital theory. Some of the most influential economists in the US — Robert Lucas is one example — were in fact quite well aware.1 Yet, they just pretended that the problem of measurement of capital was a silly problem that was best ignored. In addition to their ideology, which was hostile to such criticisms, they realized that their careers as academic economists could be furthered only by going along with the mainstream.
There is a second reason arising from a complex interplay of ideological concerns with considerations of practical benefits. If its fantastic assumptions are accepted, neoclassical economic theory serves admirably to promote the image of a smoothly functioning market economy to which the real-world economies could be made to conform through minor modifications. It thus becomes a powerful tool in the hands of those ideologically wedded to ‘market fundamentalism’. At the same time, to those with a practical bent of mind, it appears a ‘rigorous’ method of thinking about the modifications that the real-world economies might benefit from; this is reflected in the fact that the critics from the mainstream concentrate on the failure of the price mechanism due to specific reasons like incomplete information, price rigidities, increasing returns, etc. Very few are prepared to even recognize two integral features of market economies. The first is persistent unemployment that arises from a persistent lack of aggregate demand. It renders the entire theory, which makes scarcity of resources its organizing principle, problematic. When, for example, you do not operate on the production possibility frontier but inside it, you cannot really define the opportunity costs of products and factors. The second feature that the mainstream economists underplay (if not wholly ignore) is that conflicts — between consumers and producers, between producers and producers, between producers and workers, and so on — are inherent in price-setting processes. Such conflicts make their appearance in game theory but are not incorporated into a coherent system of generalized economic knowledge. Yet these are what make economic power and class interest unavoidable features of a market economy. This is what the capital controversy underlined; it pointed out that, logically, distribution had to be exogenous — determined by factors such as the balance of class forces — and that the relative prices (idealized by Sraffa through the assumption of a uniform rate of profit) reflected the exogenously determined distribution. The picture of the harmonious market economy, promoted by the neoclassical economic theory, is a logically flawed construction.
AKG: Cambridge (UK) seems to have gone a full cycle. It was a bastion of neoclassical economics (Marshall/Pigou). Then it was the birthplace and bastion of Keynesian macroeconomics. Now it has again become a centre of orthodox neoclassical economics. How and why, in your view, has this come about?
AB: In a way, I have already said something on this. To put it bluntly, the dominant reason is economists’ pursuit of self-interest in terms of career, academic respectability and rewards including the Nobel Memorial Prize. Unlike the previous generation of Cambridge economists, who had taken up the intellectual challenges of finding a solution to the problem of mass unemployment or of remedying the flaws of the dominant body of economic theory (namely, the neoclassical economic theory), most of the faculty now focus only on narrow professional recognition. The tragedy of Cambridge today is that it is not even a leading centre of neoclassical economics, as it was in the days of Marshall and Pigou. It is just an imitative place that follows passing intellectual fashions set by the leading universities in the US.
How did this come about? Most of the non-neoclassical Cambridge economists of the younger generation nose-dived into empirical work and left teaching to neoclassical economists who were ready with their conventional tools of inter-temporal optimization, general equilibrium, etc. — tools that appear naturally attractive to bright undergraduates as definite and apparently rigorous methods of producing economic knowledge. There were exceptions, like Pasinetti's (1981) work on multi-sector growth models, and the Cambridge view of balance of payments and stock-flow models in macroeconomics (Godley and Cripps, 1983), but these either did not become available in the form of readily accessible teaching material or were ignored for non-intellectual reasons. Career interests of the typical teacher and of the normal student coincided. Teachers were choosing the easy path to reputation and promotion through publication in well-known journals, which encouraged analysis in the mainstream framework; and students were aware which side of their bread was buttered. The entire game increasingly became one of showing off formal skill in the mainstream framework by a faculty which was not even innovative in that framework. The economics tradition in Cambridge, from the time of Marshall until its productive early post-Keynesian phase, was not about the show of mathematical (or soft wire) muscle power, but about posing novel questions and formulations, often with political implications. That intellectual tradition was gradually lost, and Cambridge became intellectually the imitative, colourless place it is today.
AKG: You have had an abiding interest in macroeconomics for developed economies. (I want to discuss your work in the area of development separately.) An important point you recognized was that Keynesian macroeconomics left room for contesting political ideologies. This received a good deal of emphasis in the work you did as a participant in the WIDER research project on the ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’. I recall a paper you wrote jointly with Steve Marglin (1990) in which you argue that the complex and ambiguous nature of the relationship between wages and the levels of output and employment (wages constitute an important element of aggregate demand but also have effects on aggregate supply since they affect profits via costs) provides the economic basis for contesting political ideologies. This argument appears in several of your other papers. Could you elaborate on this and on its relevance for reconstruction of macroeconomics?
AB: Let me first go back a little. Capital theory failed to connect sufficiently with the issues and problems of the real world. One saw its wide-ranging negative implications for neoclassical theory and its insecure logical basis, thanks mainly to Sraffa's work but also to the writings of Joan Robinson, but did not know what use to make of it. It is probably for this reason that Kaldor, who was most oriented towards practical problems, largely stayed away from the capital theory debate. That was a period of high growth and near-full employment, the so-called ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’, and the Cambridge economists — Kaldor, Robinson, Pasinetti — all contributed to our understanding through the elaboration of a Keynesian model of capitalistic growth. But they missed out on two fundamental changes that were underway in capitalist economies. First, globalization, by making capital flight easy, was rendering conventional fiscal policy unusable as a tool of macroeconomic management. It thus brought about a convergence of social democratic and conservative policies. Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies began to be abandoned not because they were faulty on grounds of economic logic but because closed-economy Keynesianism was becoming increasingly unworkable in a globalizing world. Second, as a theoretical framework, Keynesianism could accommodate both profit-oriented and wage-oriented policies. The joint article you mention explains this point in simple analytical terms by distinguishing between profit-led and wage-led growth in a Keynesian framework. In my later work, I have tried to show why globalization tilts the balance towards profit-led growth by emphasizing international price competitiveness and paves the way to conservative Keynesianism (Bhaduri, 2006).
AKG: Let me pursue this a bit further. You have held that Keynesian macroeconomics formed the basis for social democracy and the welfare state in capitalist countries.2 It follows that the demise of Keynesian macroeconomics will also mean their demise. So it is the advance of globalization that has killed off social democracy and the welfare state in Europe. What are your thoughts on this? Can we think of a new kind of macroeconomics that might again provide a basis for cooperative capitalism in our brave new world? Or does a rollback of globalization constitute the necessary condition for the re-establishment of social democracy and the welfare state?
AB: I think the answer to this question overlaps partly with my last response. I might add that many Keynesians were not on the right track when they argued in favour of unilateral import control to make demand management work. It is financial rather than trade openness which made the welfare state model unworkable. James Tobin was the first (in 1974) to draw our attention to the changed circumstances and suggested the imposition of a tax on cross-border financial transactions in order to make Keynesian demand management workable. However, import control in some form could be decided unilaterally by a single country, while the Tobin tax is far more problematic unless agreed at least to some extent among major capitalist countries. The main player, the USA, was unwilling and the two most important financial centres, Wall Street in New York and the City of London, were rapidly gaining a dominant position in their national economies with the globalization of finance. As the centre of gravity shifted from industry to finance, the political acceptability of the Tobin tax receded. Unsurprisingly, there was the usual run of academic economists, several recipients of the Nobel Memorial Prize from the Swedish bankers among them, finding great virtues in monetarism, rational expectations, efficient financial market hypothesis, etc.
But the current financial crisis has created space for a new theory, just as Britain's humiliating exit from the Gold Standard in 1931 had created political space for the acceptance of Keynes's theory (this, according to Steindl, was Kalecki's view). Minsky3 has been discovered even by mainstream economists, and efficient financial market theories these days have few takers outside Chicago. But an adequate theory that could guide a reshaping of the welfare state to suit new circumstances is not yet in place. Its need is being strongly felt even by ordinary citizens. Hopefully necessity will be the mother of invention, giving birth to an analytically sharp understanding of modern capitalism in which global finance has assumed such importance.
AKG: In a recent (as yet unpublished) paper on ‘Finance and the real economy: modelling the crisis’ (Bhaduri, 2010b), you try to explain how a relatively small problem within the financial sector could have hugely magnified effects and generate a systemic crisis in developed countries, affecting not only the financial sector but also the real economy. Could you elaborate on this? What do you think of the policy responses of governments to the crisis?
AB: I have realized that financial fragility and crisis originate mostly within the financial sector itself, not in the real economy. But the real economy is critical in shaping the attitude to uncertainty in financial markets. New credit instruments, highly leveraged and backed with little liquidity, and the interlocking of assets among the financial firms (e.g. mortgage and investment banks, mutual funds, etc.), are the consequences of the ‘feel-good’ factor in the real economy, which reduces perceived economic uncertainty. In times of boom and rising asset values, these instruments of credit serve well both for transaction and speculative purposes. But if even relatively small defaults occur, the lenders involved cannot cover their immediate obligations because their liquidity holdings are too little. Nor can they borrow their way out of the problem since all financial firms are similarly placed, i.e., with insufficient liquidity holdings. Distress sales of assets by financial firms begin, leading to falling asset prices and a debt deflation in the worst case scenario. This, to my way of thinking, comes closest to describing the outlines of modern financial crisis of the type we are witnessing.
What I am suggesting is a ‘dual instability’ hypothesis which postulates that prosperity and stability in the real economy induces instability and fragility in the financial sector, and vice versa. This view derives sustenance from Keynes on the connection between money and uncertainty, and from Minsky on the transition from hedge to speculative to Ponzi finance by firms. What I think is different in my position is that I argue for a greater focus on the liquidity preference of financial firms and on the evolution in their financial positions to understand the nature of recurring crisis in a modern economy where finance dominates.
The implication for policy — the importance of timing of intervention — is insufficiently appreciated even by the Keynesians. Tighter regulations to check the speculative boom in the financial sector need to be introduced at an early stage, and not when the crisis is on. I hope this lesson will finally be learnt. There are two aspects of policy that receives less attention. A financial bubble is deliberately nurtured to stimulate aggregate demand through a wealth effect on consumption. It helps the rich only, and this is the new face of conservative Keynesianism going beyond profit-led growth. We need to direct regulations against such asset price bubbles by imposing a tax on transaction of financial securities, and use it effectively early in the game when the ‘feel-good’ factor is gaining momentum. Second, a sharp fall in the share of wages in value added, as happened recently in most OECD countries, should be treated as a danger signal that maintenance of effective demand might turn unnatural, e.g. by further tax concessions to the rich, and a partly engineered asset price bubble.
A new version of the welfare state must focus on measures that prevent the wage share from falling. Thus maintaining high employment through public action (for which well thought-out employment expansion plans must always be held in reserve) and preventing deterioration of conditions of work (which tends to be justified on grounds of retaining competitive edge internationally) are of critical importance. This type of radical framework using Keynesian reasoning is what we need, not just some tightening of regulations on banks and financial firms. The latter would achieve little because new instruments would soon be found to circumvent them even if they are seriously implemented. We need policies which go beyond bureaucratic regulations, and are capable of creating a widespread support base among the working people.
AKG: I would now like to move to your work on development. A very well-known line of your work focused on the lack of dynamism in the agricultural sector of developing countries. I think you took a ‘vicious circle’ view of this (for instance in Bhaduri, 1973, 1977, and several other papers). A corollary would be that state interventions designed to restructure land and credit relations are absolutely essential for transforming agriculture. Could you give your reflections on this set of issues? Do you think the characterization retains validity even today?
AB: My work on semi-feudal agriculture was not meant to be a part of the grand debate on the mode of production in Indian agriculture. I was theorizing about what I saw in West Bengal villages in the early 1970s. Restricting your question to that kind of context, my short answer is that reforms of land ownership and tenancy rights alone do not bring about sustainable change in that type of agriculture; simultaneous reforms of credit and marketing systems are also required. A good illustration of the point is provided by the fact that, in the aftermath of the land reforms of the late 1970s in West Bengal, a significant section of the tenant-beneficiaries actually surrendered their newly acquired rights informally to a new class of better-off local landowners, traders, etc. for credit and marketing access. Agricultural output increased but power shifted to the more privileged agriculturists. If power is to be shifted to the masses of agriculturists, intervention has to be more comprehensive than a simple programme of land-to-the-tiller.
This is a general proposition in so far as it is valid in several other situations. In Vidarbha (Maharashtra), for example, insufficient land ownership was not the central factor that explained the disastrous consequences of the introduction of Bt cotton. Over the last decade, more than 100,000 farmers have committed suicide, and thousands more have been economically ruined. The brief story is this. While the introduction of Bt cotton increased the costs of cultivation dramatically, the state actually withdrew credit facilities, price support and extension services in the name of liberalization. Multinationals and their agents moved in to fill the vacuum. They sold seeds that could not be reproduced by the farmer and also provided credit to cover working capital requirements, which had vastly increased (because Bt cotton required more water, insecticide, etc.). In these circumstances, one failed crop often meant the point of no return for the small farmer. His creditor was the corporate agent who himself needed to pay back to his masters in time, and could not afford to show any leniency. Small farmers became victims of a new system driven by corporate capital, which shared some of the features of semi-feudalism that I had discussed in a different context.
AKG: Since the mid-1980s, globalization has advanced inexorably. The core of this globalization has been the growth of cross-border trade and capital flows. Orthodox economic theory suggests that growth of trade and capital flows should benefit the developing countries by bringing comparative advantage into play and by augmenting investment. This indeed is the principal argument consistently advanced in support of globalization and widely accepted by policy makers in developing countries. I know that you reject this argument. Indeed, you have argued that globalization has promoted what you call predatory growth — a process in which economic growth and distributional inequality feed on each other — in India. Such growth can be rapid, as indeed it has been in India, but it intensifies the economic deprivation of a large section of the population. That there is predatory growth in India, as indeed in many other developing countries, is perhaps clear to many observers. What is less clear is that this kind of growth has been the result of increased openness of developing countries to trade and capital flows. Could you elaborate on the link between globalization and predatory growth?
AB: Let me just point to some of the important links. Globalization encourages international price competitiveness and technology upgrading, thereby undermining employment growth. But the crucial point, almost invariably overlooked, is that products for the international market (which richer sections of the population in developing countries also consume) can only be produced by large corporations, which at best develop subcontracting relations with just some of the producers in the informal sector. The consequent growth process leaves out the majority, both as producers and as consumers. This generates inequality and exclusion. Moreover, corporations from poor countries like India or China can compete internationally only with support from the state. So the corporations, through political bribes and corruption, create powerful lobbies to push for pro-corporate policies. The state finds the prospect of corporate-led high growth alluring and feels obliged to provide support to corporations by handing over natural resources like land, water, forest and mineral resources at throw away prices. These methods of subsidizing the corporations destroy traditional livelihoods on a massive scale in the poorest areas without generating alternative livelihoods. Alongside, the safety net programmes of the government — social welfare programmes, education and health services and insurance for the informal sector workers — get weaker because financial globalization imposes strict limits on the government's social spending.
It is easy to understand then why popular resistance is the inevitable outcome to this kind of corporate-led growth. If predatory growth of this variety continues unabated for long, then I believe it would destroy whatever is left of our democracy and replace it with a completely empty shell of a formally democratic system that can hide the fascist repression of the poor in support of predatory high growth. India's tragedy is that its political parties, across the spectrum from the Right to the Left, seem unable or unwilling to see the writing on the wall, and believe they can have a ‘law and order’ solution to the ‘problem’ of popular resistance with help from the corporate beneficiaries.
AKG: So your argument is that globalization, by making corporations the central players, has induced what you call developmental terrorism in India (and perhaps also in other developing countries). In particular, a massive land grab by large corporations, domestic and foreign, is going on with the connivance and even active assistance of federal and state governments. The excuse is development. And the result is physical displacement and destruction of livelihoods of the poor. But can we really hold globalization responsible for this state of affairs?
AB: No, I hold the federal and state governments primarily responsible. The policy makers in India have shown a total lack of intellectual imagination. They have promoted and continue to promote the idea that there is no alternative to globalization in its current form. This is untrue. There is the notion of strategic openness for each developing country. The strategic openness for Brazil with a large and politically powerful financial sector is different from that for Bolivia with a large mining sector or that for Ecuador with its environmental problems. Each country's strategic openness is path-dependent (sorry for the jargon).
Globalization certainly offers the individual countries the option of passively integrating into the global economy, but that is not the only option that the individual countries face. The sensible route to integration for each country is one of strategic openness, the nature and degree of which is determined by considerations of the country's internal balance of class power and of its strategic advantage in trade, not in a static but in a dynamic framework of comparative advantage. This to my mind is the relevant form of ‘economic nationalism’ required to moderate the effects of globalization. Many countries including India have failed to pursue this kind of economic nationalism.
AKG: While opposing predatory growth and developmental terrorism, you also acknowledge the need to develop an alternative model of growth, which is currently lacking. In this context, you have argued that ensuring full employment must be the objective of economic policy in developing countries and that economic growth should simply be the outcome of a programme for full employment. (I am thinking particularly of your 2005 book, Development with Dignity.) But is it really possible for governments in developing countries to ensure both that there is full employment and that employment is also productive so that there is economic growth? The ex-communist countries had in fact guaranteed full employment, but, as you have yourself recognized, the result was a lot of unproductive employment and ultimately economic stagnation. Could you elaborate on your idea of the alternative growth model?
AB: Nobody has a clear idea, and I too am still exploring possibilities and ways of creating productive employment extensively within a short period. At this point, I would emphasize three basic pre-requisites for an alternative growth strategy. First, the relative emphasis must shift from the external to the internal market so as to ensure that the poor majority of our population participates in the growth process both as consumers and as producers. Related to this, second, is the need to generate productive employment at local levels to meet local needs to a much greater extent. This implies, in turn, that control over local resources and their use would have to be vested in the hands of local authorities. This means, third, decentralization of decision making together with financial autonomy for local level governments going down to the Gram Sabhas (village councils). Development is a historical process. It cannot be equated to a growth of capacity for production of sophisticated goods. The notion of development for a poor rural Indian today is very different from that for an urban middle class person. The poor Indian's notion of development would also change if things became better for him, and the growth strategy I talk about would then be rethought to suit another context. I am talking about our development now, and the three pre-requisites are critical in that context.
I would like to emphasize one final point about the political implication of this alternative development paradigm. We all should know that there is no development economics without developmental politics outside classrooms. Development as a historical process is driven by economic, political and social compulsions. These compulsions have worked in such a way in India that western-style multi-party representative democracy has largely failed, as experience is showing every day. Three mutually reinforcing processes have made representational democracy dysfunctional in recent years (since liberalization). First, fighting elections to the federal parliament has become an extraordinarily expensive business for individual candidates, despite the existence of laws that set limits to election expenditure; some observers put the average figure at 80 million rupees. It is not by accident that 60 per cent of the members of India's parliament today are multi-millionaires. Second, a good part of these millions is being made in land and other natural resource related deals, the biggest outlets for black money. Third, all parliamentary political parties have to raise huge funds to fight elections.
Now you can join the dots to complete the picture. A big part of the money required to fight elections is raised today through deals between the state and the corporations with respect to the use of natural resources like land, water, forest, mineral resources, sea coast and other common resources. The process leads to dispossession of the poor millions who have long survived in a natural economy based on these resources. These people are being mercilessly dispossessed by a nexus of politicians, corporate houses, bureaucrats, media and judiciary in the name of development and the maintenance of law and order. All political parties have come to converge on this model of high growth by dispossession of the poor. They pretend there is no alternative.
What we need are genuine people's movements outside the tutelage of any political party, which can resist this process of predatory growth. The Indian countryside today is dotted with literally thousands of such movements, long-lasting or temporary, some resorting to violence, others non-violent. And state terror is being used indiscriminately in the name of saving democracy from all those poor people fighting for their livelihoods, no matter whether the resistance is non-violent (Gandhian) or violent (Maoist) or simply sporadic and spontaneous. We need less of this representative democracy which relies on state-sponsored violence and terror to sustain the show. We need instead more direct democracy through direct participation by the masses in production, consumption and politics at the local level. The alternative model of development is a preliminary step in that direction.
I am fully aware that this is not an easy process; nor can real decentralization come from above. It is rather a question of asserting rights through a new course of developmental politics that enhances the power of local bodies to take initiatives and to define their own path of development. Problems of caste, religious and gender oppression, and the difficulties of coordinating decisions among local bodies would not simply go away even with this type of decentralization. However, we must learn to look at this process as something akin to a biological process of development. One of the most distinguished molecular biologists of the last century, Monod, described biological processes as an interplay of ‘chance versus necessity’. The logic of our situation dictates the necessity that we must move towards more direct democracy. The enormous diversity of people's resistance and local initiatives for development would ensure by the law of probability that some of the chance elements would produce favourable results. The purpose of the alternative model of development is to provide enough space and support to consolidate those initiatives into a winning combination over time.
- 1983) Macroeconomics. Oxford : Oxford University Press. and (
- 1988) ‘On the Mechanics of Economic Development’, Journal of Monetary Economics 22: 3–42. (
- 1986) Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven , CT : Yale University Press. (
- 1981) Structural Change and Economic Growth: A Theoretical Essay on the Wealth of Nations. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. (
SELECTED WORKS OF AMIT BHADURI
- 1966) ‘The Concept of the Marginal Productivity of Capital and the Wicksell Effect’, Oxford Economic Papers 18(3): 284–88. (
- 1969) ‘On the Recent Controversy on Capital Theory: A Marxian View’, Economic Journal 79(315): 532–9. (
- 1970) ‘A Physical Analogue of the Re-switching Problem’, Oxford Economic Papers 22(2): 148–55. (
- 1973) ‘A Study of Agricultural Backwardness under Semi-feudalism’, Economic Journal 83: 120–37. (
- 1977) ‘On the Formation of Usurious Interest Rates in Backward Agriculture’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 1(4): 341–52. (
- 1983) The Economic Structure of Backward Agriculture. London and New York : Academic Press. (
- 1986) Macroeconomics: The Dynamics of Commodity Production. London : Macmillan. (
- 1990) ‘Unemployment and the Real Wage: The Economic Basis of Contesting Political Ideologies’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 14(4): 375–93. with (
- 1993a) Unconventional Economic Essays. New Delhi : Oxford University Press. (
- 1993b) ‘The Economics and Politics of Social Democracy’, in P. Bardhan, M. Datta-Chaudhuri and T.N. Krishnan (eds) Development and Change: Essays in Honour of K. N. Raj, pp. 59–68. New Delhi : Oxford University Press. (
- 1996) The Intelligent Person's Guide to Liberalization. New Delhi : Penguin. with (
- 1999) On the Border of Economic Theory and History. New Delhi : Oxford University Press. (
- 2002) ‘Nationalism and Economic Policy in the Era of Globalisation’, in D. Nayyar (ed.) Governing Globalisation, pp. 19–50. Oxford : Clarendon Press. (
- 2005) Development with Dignity. New Delhi : National Book Trust. (
- 2006) Employment and Development: Essays from an Unorthodox Perspective. New Delhi : Oxford University Press. (
- 2007) Growth, Distribution and Innovations. London : Routledge. (
- 2008) ‘On the Dynamics of Profit- and Wage-led Growth’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 32(1): 147–60. (
- 2009) The Face You were Afraid to See. New Delhi : Penguin. (
- 2010a) ‘The Political Economy of Social Democracy’, in A. Bhaduri (ed.) Essays in the Reconstruction of Political Economy, pp. 74–98. New Delhi : Aakar Books. (
- 2010b) ‘Finance and the Real Economy: Modelling the Crisis’. http://www.centrocelsofurtado.org.br/textos/FINANCE%20AND%20THE%20REAL%20ECONOMY.pdf (