The authors wish to acknowledge support from a Research Fellowship and a Grant in Aid from Temple University, and also to thank Kathryn Ledebur and Juan Arbona for comments on different versions of this article, and Sara Shields for interview assistance.
Conflicting Agendas: The Politics of Development Aid in Drug-Producing Areas
Version of Record online: 18 FEB 2005
Development Policy Review
Volume 23, Issue 2, pages 183–198, March 2005
How to Cite
Farthing, L. and Kohl, B. (2005), Conflicting Agendas: The Politics of Development Aid in Drug-Producing Areas. Development Policy Review, 23: 183–198. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7679.2005.00282.x
- Issue online: 18 FEB 2005
- Version of Record online: 18 FEB 2005
- first submitted December 2004; final revision accepted December 2004
When international development policy prioritises goals determined by the donor's domestic policy concerns, aid agencies not only fail in their development objectives but can also generate conflict in the recipient country. In the Bolivian Chapare, where the United States is driven by the need to demonstrate success in controlling cocaine production, policies to eradicate coca leaf have led to programmes with limited development impact that increase conflict both locally and nationally. In contrast, the European Union's successful collaboration with local governments which began in 1998 provides insights into generating sustainable development and de-escalating conflict in drug-producing regions worldwide.