Not by Rent Alone: Analysing the Pro-Poor Functions of Small-Scale Fisheries in Developing Countries
Version of Record online: 1 APR 2010
© The Authors 2010. Journal compilation © 2010 Overseas Development Institute.
Development Policy Review
Volume 28, Issue 3, pages 325–358, May 2010
How to Cite
Béné, C., Hersoug, B. and Allison, E. H. (2010), Not by Rent Alone: Analysing the Pro-Poor Functions of Small-Scale Fisheries in Developing Countries. Development Policy Review, 28: 325–358. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7679.2010.00486.x
- Issue online: 1 APR 2010
- Version of Record online: 1 APR 2010
- first submitted October 2009 final revision accepted December 2009
- Poverty reduction;
- common pool resources;
- safety nets;
- economic development;
- labour buffer
The dominant view in academic and policy arenas is increasingly one in which the major contribution of capture fisheries to development should be derived from the capacity of society to maximise the economic rent of fishery resources. Drawing upon empirical experience from the South, this article highlights the potentially disastrous consequences that a universal implementation of the rent-maximisation model would have in developing countries, and argues that a more gradual approach would be preferable. The welfare function of small-scale fisheries, namely, their capacities to provide labour and cash income to resource-poor households, should be preserved until the appropriate macroeconomic conditions for rent-maximisation and redistribution are fulfilled.