*The author is grateful for the assistance of Gar Alperovitz, Larry Bland, Colonel Charles Brower IV, Peter Duus, Max Holland, David Holloway, Martin J. Sherwin, Ferenc Szasz, and Herman Wolk; and for support from the MacArthur Foundation, the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, the NSF History of Science Program, and Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). Lectures and seminars based partly on this paper have been the subject of separate sessions of the American Historical Association, the Nuclear History Group, and the Peace Studies Program, and many of the ideas were worked out in my Stanford courses on postwar America, decision making in international crises, and nuclear history and international relations theory.
Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory
Version of Record online: 1 JUN 2007
Volume 19, Issue 2, pages 227–273, March 1995
How to Cite
BERNSTEIN, B. J. (1995), Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory. Diplomatic History, 19: 227–273. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.1995.tb00657.x
- Issue online: 1 JUN 2007
- Version of Record online: 1 JUN 2007