Résumé en fin d'article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resumen al fin del artículo.
USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS TO DESIGN EFFICIENT MARKET INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS
Article first published online: 28 NOV 2006
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics
Volume 77, Issue 4, pages 555–577, December 2006
How to Cite
Staropoli, C. and Jullien, C. (2006), USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS TO DESIGN EFFICIENT MARKET INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 77: 555–577. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00319.x
- Issue published online: 28 NOV 2006
- Article first published online: 28 NOV 2006
ABSTRACT**: This paper assesses the contribution of laboratory experiments to the economics of design applied to the electricity industry. The analysis is dedicated to wholesale markets, and reviews the results accumulated to date concerning both the general architecture of power markets and the very details of the market rules or institution, that is the auction rule. We argue that these experimental results contribute to a better understanding of the performances properties and implementation features of competitive market designs and that experimental economics has proven very useful to public authorities to inform the restructuring of the electricity industry. It thus confirms the role of experimental economics as a complement to theoretical approaches in the design effort.