II—Naomi Eilan ON THE ROLE OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN EXPLAINING THE GOALS AND MECHANISMS OF VISION: A CONVERGENCE ON ATTENTION?
Article first published online: 7 FEB 2007
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Volume 80, Issue 1, pages 67–88, June 2006
How to Cite
Eilan, N. (2006), II—Naomi Eilan ON THE ROLE OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN EXPLAINING THE GOALS AND MECHANISMS OF VISION: A CONVERGENCE ON ATTENTION?. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 80: 67–88. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2006.00138.x
- Issue published online: 7 FEB 2007
- Article first published online: 7 FEB 2007
- Cited By
ABSTRACT The strong sensorimotor account of perception gives self-induced movements two constitutive roles in explaining visual consciousness. The first says that self-induced movements are vehicles of visual awareness, and for this reason consciousness ‘does not happen in the brain only’. The second says that the phenomenal nature of visual experiences is consists in the action-directing content of vision. In response I suggest, first, that the sense in which visual awareness is active should be explained by appeal to the role of attention in visual consciousness, rather than self-induced movements; and second, that the sense in which perceptual consciousness does not happen in the brain only should be explained by appeal to the relational nature of perceptual consciousness, appeal to which also shows why links with action cannot exhaust phenomenal content.