II—What is the Normative Role of Logic?
Article first published online: 6 MAY 2009
© 2009 The Aristotelian Society
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Volume 83, Issue 1, pages 269–298, June 2009
How to Cite
Milne, P. (2009), II—What is the Normative Role of Logic?. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 83: 269–298. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2009.00182.x
- Issue published online: 6 MAY 2009
- Article first published online: 6 MAY 2009
In making assertions one takes on commitments to the consistency of what one asserts and to the logical consequences of what one asserts. Although there is no quick link between belief and assertion, the dialectical requirements on assertion feed back into normative constraints on those beliefs that constitute one's evidence. But if we are not certain of many of our beliefs and that uncertainty is modelled in terms of probabilities, then there is at least prima facie incoherence between the normative constraints on belief and the probability-like structure of degrees of belief. I suggest that the norm-governed practice relating to degrees of belief is the evaluation of betting odds.