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II—Millar on the Value of Knowledge
Article first published online: 17 MAY 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00197.x
© 2011 The Aristotelian Society
Additional Information
How to Cite
Kvanvig, J. L. (2011), II—Millar on the Value of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 85: 83–99. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00197.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 17 MAY 2011
- Article first published online: 17 MAY 2011
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
Alan Millar's paper (2011) involves two parts, which I address in order, first taking up the issues concerning the goal of inquiry, and then the issues surrounding the appeal to reflective knowledge. I argue that the upshot of the considerations Millar raises count in favour of a more important role in value-driven epistemology for the notion of understanding and for the notion of epistemic justification, rather than for the notions of knowledge and reflective knowledge.