This is fully collaborative work, and no significance attaches to the (alphabetical) order of the authors' names.
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I—An Originalist Theory of Concepts
Article first published online: 17 MAY 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00198.x
© 2011 The Aristotelian Society
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How to Cite
Sainsbury, R. M. and Tye, M. (2011), I—An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 85: 101–124. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00198.x
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This is fully collaborative work, and no significance attaches to the (alphabetical) order of the authors' names.
Publication History
- Issue published online: 17 MAY 2011
- Article first published online: 17 MAY 2011
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications.