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I—Transparency, Belief, Intention
Article first published online: 17 MAY 2011
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00203.x
© 2011 The Aristotelian Society
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How to Cite
Byrne, A. (2011), I—Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 85: 201–221. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00203.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 17 MAY 2011
- Article first published online: 17 MAY 2011
- Abstract
- References
- Cited By
This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.