I indulge this bit of terminology from Cresswell (1975) because (a) ‘meaning’ is not an adjective, so we'd have to employ something equally nerdish like ‘meaning-theoretic truth’, and (b) ‘extensional’, ‘intensional’ and ‘hyperintensional’ suggest the going up of a hierarchy. Or down into the slums.
Truth and Meaning
II—Hyperintensional Truth Conditions†
Version of Record online: 3 JUN 2014
© 2014 The Aristotelian Society
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Volume 88, Issue 1, pages 57–68, June 2014
How to Cite
Kemp, G. (2014), II—Hyperintensional Truth Conditions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 88: 57–68. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2014.00232.x
- Issue online: 3 JUN 2014
- Version of Record online: 3 JUN 2014
A response to certain parts of Rumfitt (2014): I defend Davidson's project in semantics, suggest that Rumfitt's use of sentential quantification renders his definition of truth needlessly elaborate, and pose a question for Rumfitt's handling of the strengthened Liar.