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EMPIRICAL ETHICS AND ITS ALLEGED META-ETHICAL FALLACIES
Article first published online: 27 MAR 2009
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01710.x
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Additional Information
How to Cite
DE VRIES, R. and GORDIJN, B. (2009), EMPIRICAL ETHICS AND ITS ALLEGED META-ETHICAL FALLACIES. Bioethics, 23: 193–201. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01710.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 27 MAR 2009
- Article first published online: 27 MAR 2009
Keywords:
- empirical ethics;
- is-ought problem;
- naturalistic fallacy;
- fact-value distinction
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the concept of empirical ethics as well as three meta-ethical fallacies that empirical ethics is said to face: the is-ought problem, the naturalistic fallacy and violation of the fact-value distinction. Moreover, it answers the question of whether empirical ethics (necessarily) commits these three basic meta-ethical fallacies.