This paper has benefitted from useful discussions with Peter Dolton, Gerry Makepeace and Simon Vicary.
THE ‘CHILLING EFFECT’ OF CONVENTIONAL ARBITRATION: A COUNTEREXAMPLE
Article first published online: 29 APR 2007
Bulletin of Economic Research
Volume 41, Issue 1, pages 59–68, January 1989
How to Cite
Treble, J. G. (1989), THE ‘CHILLING EFFECT’ OF CONVENTIONAL ARBITRATION: A COUNTEREXAMPLE. Bulletin of Economic Research, 41: 59–68. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.1989.tb00278.x
- Issue published online: 29 APR 2007
- Article first published online: 29 APR 2007
- Received February 1988, revision accepted May 1988
In the context of a simple model, it is demonstrated that it is possible for a conventional arbitrator to determine his decision in such a way as to remove the so-called ‘chilling effect’. It is shown that an arbitrator adopting the kind of rule envisaged here would be more successful in moderating claims of the negotiators than would a final-offer arbitrator.