AN ULTIMATUM WAGE BARGAINING EXPERIMENT ON TRADE UNION EFFICIENCY
Financial support by the Junta de Andalucía (P07-SEJ-03155) and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2008–04636/ECON) is gratefully acknowledged. Comments received by two referees on a previous version substantially improved the manuscript. The usual disclaimer applies.
Correspondence: Nikolaos Georgantzís, GLOBE & Economics Dept., Granada University, Campus de la Cartuja, 18011 Granada-Spain. Tel: 0034958241000 ext. 20147; Fax: 0034958249995; Email: firstname.lastname@example.org.
We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.