Financial support by the Junta de Andalucía (P07-SEJ-03155) and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2008–04636/ECON) is gratefully acknowledged. Comments received by two referees on a previous version substantially improved the manuscript. The usual disclaimer applies.
AN ULTIMATUM WAGE BARGAINING EXPERIMENT ON TRADE UNION EFFICIENCY
Article first published online: 5 OCT 2011
© 2011 The Authors. Bulletin of Economic Research © 2011 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research
Bulletin of Economic Research
Volume 65, Issue 4, pages 354–361, October 2013
How to Cite
Andreou, A., Andreou, S. N., García-Gallego, A. and Georgantzís, N. (2013), AN ULTIMATUM WAGE BARGAINING EXPERIMENT ON TRADE UNION EFFICIENCY. Bulletin of Economic Research, 65: 354–361. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00406.x
- Issue published online: 9 SEP 2013
- Article first published online: 5 OCT 2011
- Junta de Andalucía. Grant Number: P07-SEJ-03155
- Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. Grant Number: ECO2008–04636/ECON
- trade unions;
- ultimatum bargaining;
We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.