UNIONS' RELATIVE CONCERNS AND STRIKES IN WAGE BARGAINING

Authors


  • We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments on a previous draft. Vincent Vannetelbosch and Ana Mauleon are, respectively, Senior Research Associate and Research Associate of the National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS). Financial support from Spanish Ministry of Sciences and Innovation under the project ECO 2009-09120, support from the Belgian French Community's programme Action de Recherches Concertée 05/10-331, and support of an SSTC grant from the Belgian Federal government under the IAP contract P6/09 are gratefully acknowledged. Cecilia Vergari acknowledges the financial support from the University of Bologna under the 2010-2011 RFO scheme.

ABSTRACT

We consider a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that an increase of unions’ relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike activity.

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