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Keywords:

  • Corporate social responsibility;
  • institutional investors;
  • Anglo-American corporate governance system

Abstract

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
  3. References

This paper argues that key differences between the UK and the US in the importance ascribed to a company's social responsibilities (CSR) reflect differences in the corporate governance arrangements in these two countries. Specifically, we analyse the role of a salient type of owner in the UK and the US, institutional investors, in emphasising firm-level CSR actions. We explore differences between institutional investors in the UK and the US concerning CSR, and draw on a model of instrumental, relational and moral motives to explore why institutional investors in the UK are becoming concerned with firms’ social and environmental actions. We conclude with some suggestions for future research in this area.

References

  1. Top of page
  2. Abstract
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