The Role of Nominating Committees and Director Reputation in Shaping the Labor Market for Directors: An Empirical Assessment
Version of Record online: 28 OCT 2010
© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Corporate Governance: An International Review
Volume 18, Issue 6, pages 557–574, November 2010
How to Cite
Eminet, A. and Guedri, Z. (2010), The Role of Nominating Committees and Director Reputation in Shaping the Labor Market for Directors: An Empirical Assessment. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18: 557–574. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00814.x
- Issue online: 28 OCT 2010
- Version of Record online: 28 OCT 2010
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