The Origins of Wittgenstein's Imaginary Scenarios: Something Old, Something New
Version of Record online: 8 SEP 2004
Volume 27, Issue 4, pages 299–327, October 2004
How to Cite
Peach, A. J. (2004), The Origins of Wittgenstein's Imaginary Scenarios: Something Old, Something New. Philosophical Investigations, 27: 299–327. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2004.00229.x
- Issue online: 8 SEP 2004
- Version of Record online: 8 SEP 2004
The imaginary scenarios that appear in nearly every work of the later Wittgenstein – ones involving laughing cattle, disembodied eyes that see, and the like – are decidedly absent from the Tractatus. What necessitated this change in methodology? A comparison of the Tractatus with the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein's first major work after his return to philosophy, reveals that these devices are the product of something old and something new. The rationale for these devices is already present in the notion of a “propositional variable,” but Wittgenstein had little use for them until he rejected the phenomenological language and laconic style of the Tractatus.