The Truth about Philosophical Investigations I §§134–1371
Version of Record online: 24 MAR 2005
Volume 28, Issue 2, pages 159–176, April 2005
How to Cite
Vision, G. (2005), The Truth about Philosophical Investigations I §§134–137. Philosophical Investigations, 28: 159–176. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2005.00249.x
- Issue online: 24 MAR 2005
- Version of Record online: 24 MAR 2005
A broad, though not unanimous, consensus among commentators is that the later Wittgenstein subscribes to a redundancy conception of truth. I reject that interpretation. No doubt much depends on what is meant by a redundancy theory. But once even mildly plausible versions of that view are isolated a review of the relevant texts shows that the evidence for that interpretation collapses. Moreover, the redundancy interpretation is at odds with guiding prescriptions in the post-1932 corpus. Wittgenstein doesn’t hold that truth can be defined or characterized thinly, as redundancy theorists propose, but that it isn’t susceptible to any such generic treatment.