“Part of the Very Concept”: Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy1
Version of Record online: 26 FEB 2012
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Volume 36, Issue 1, pages 37–55, January 2013
How to Cite
Carter, D. (2013), “Part of the Very Concept”: Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy. Philosophical Investigations, 36: 37–55. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2011.01467.x
- Issue online: 11 DEC 2012
- Version of Record online: 26 FEB 2012
X is “part of the very concept” of Y. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond Gaita's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's. I elucidate the formulation's meaning and the nature of the necessity posited, then conclude with a criticism. One cannot love evil. One cannot love cow dung. For Gaita, these claims differ in type. The first testifies to a conceptual relation, but the second to a “mere fact.” I see no clear basis for assigning to claims one type over another, which challenges the footing of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Why do no moral“mere facts” partly define our form of life?