WHY AREN'T DUTIES RIGHTS?
Version of Record online: 14 MAR 2006
The Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 56, Issue 223, pages 175–192, April 2006
How to Cite
Cruft, R. (2006), WHY AREN'T DUTIES RIGHTS?. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 175–192. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00436.x
- Issue online: 14 MAR 2006
- Version of Record online: 14 MAR 2006
The best analyses of the concept ‘rights’ maintain that Hohfeldian claims, privileges, powers, immunities, liabilities, and clusters of these positions, all qualify as rights when they satisfy some further condition, such as serving their holder's interests, or fulfilling some alternative function. But duties, disabilities and no-rights can also satisfy this further condition. For example, many duties, disabilities and no-rights serve their holder's interests, and fulfil ‘right-like’ functions. Why, then, do we disallow such duties, disabilities and no-rights from qualifying as rights?