ARE THERE NON-EXISTENT INTENTIONALIA?
Version of Record online: 16 JUN 2006
The Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 56, Issue 224, pages 436–441, July 2006
How to Cite
Voltolini, A. (2006), ARE THERE NON-EXISTENT INTENTIONALIA?. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 436–441. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00451.x
- Issue online: 16 JUN 2006
- Version of Record online: 16 JUN 2006
Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived of as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. While I take this metaphysical thesis to be correct, I cast doubt on whether it excludes intentionalia, especially non-existent ones, from the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think it does. There is a tension here, since Crane uses intentionalia in order to individuate intentional states, but at the same time attempts to dispense with them. If my doubts are grounded, the tension disappears.