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FROM E = K TO SCEPTICISM?
Article first published online: 22 FEB 2008
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.562.x
© 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
Additional Information
How to Cite
Littlejohn, C. (2008), FROM E = K TO SCEPTICISM?. The Philosophical Quarterly, 58: 679–684. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.562.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 16 SEP 2008
- Article first published online: 22 FEB 2008
Abstract
In a recent article Dylan Dodd has argued that anyone who holds that all knowledge is evidence must concede that we know next to nothing about the external world. The argument is intended to show that any infallibilist account of knowledge is committed to scepticism, and that anyone who identifies our evidence with the propositions we know is committed to infallibilism. I shall offer some reasons for thinking Dodd's argument is unsound, and explain where his argument goes wrong.