FROM E = K TO SCEPTICISM?
Version of Record online: 22 FEB 2008
© 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
The Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 58, Issue 233, pages 679–684, October 2008
How to Cite
Littlejohn, C. (2008), FROM E = K TO SCEPTICISM?. The Philosophical Quarterly, 58: 679–684. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.562.x
- Issue online: 16 SEP 2008
- Version of Record online: 22 FEB 2008
In a recent article Dylan Dodd has argued that anyone who holds that all knowledge is evidence must concede that we know next to nothing about the external world. The argument is intended to show that any infallibilist account of knowledge is committed to scepticism, and that anyone who identifies our evidence with the propositions we know is committed to infallibilism. I shall offer some reasons for thinking Dodd's argument is unsound, and explain where his argument goes wrong.