STABILIZING ALETHIC PLURALISM

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Abstract

Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of being true (T1 ... Tn). A simple argument, the ‘instability challenge’, purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T1 or ... or Tn. Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth is uniform across domains, contra pluralism. I defend pluralism against the instability challenge. I show that the challenge bifurcates: one challenge is formulated in terms of predicates, and the other is formulated in terms of properties. The pluralist has the resources to defuse both of these. The sparse/abundant property distinction and considerations of explanatory asymmetry play a crucial role in my argument.

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