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CAUSAL REFUTATIONS OF IDEALISM REVISITED
Article first published online: 14 DEC 2010
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.689.x
© 2011 The Author The Philosophical Quarterly© 2011 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
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How to Cite
Chignell, A. (2011), CAUSAL REFUTATIONS OF IDEALISM REVISITED. The Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 184–186. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.689.x
Publication History
- Issue published online: 14 DEC 2010
- Article first published online: 14 DEC 2010
Abstract
Causal refutations of external-world scepticism start from our ability to make justified judgements about the order of our own experiences, and end with the claim that there must be perceptible external objects, some of whose states can be causally correlated with that order. In a recent paper, I made a series of objections to this broadly Kantian anti-sceptical strategy. Georges Dicker has provided substantive replies on behalf of a version of the causal refutation of idealism. Here I offer a few final remarks about issues at the heart of our disagreement.