WHERE IS THE FREE AGENCY IN PERSONAL AGENCY?
Article first published online: 14 JUN 2011
© 2011 The Author The Philosophical Quarterly© 2011 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
The Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 61, Issue 244, pages 630–632, July 2011
How to Cite
Pulman, C.G. (2011), WHERE IS THE FREE AGENCY IN PERSONAL AGENCY?. The Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 630–632. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.705.x
- Issue published online: 21 JUN 2011
- Article first published online: 14 JUN 2011
According to Jonathan Lowe's ‘Personal Agency’, free actions begin with a volition or act of will, which is itself a freely performed action. However, Lowe's explanation of why volitions are free actions is viciously circular: he argues that volitions qualify as free actions because they are rationally explicable, but claims that an action can only be rationally explicable if it is freely performed.