Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 18 June 2007 at 4:15 pm.
Article first published online: 26 OCT 2007
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 107, Issue 1pt3, pages 319–337, October 2007
How to Cite
Christensen, D. (2007), XIII—Epistemic Self-Respect. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 107: 319–337. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00224.x
- Issue published online: 26 OCT 2007
- Article first published online: 26 OCT 2007
Certain situations seem to call for acknowledging the possibility that one's own beliefs are biased or distorted. On the other hand, certain sorts of epistemic self-doubts (such as ‘I believe it's raining, but it's not’) seem paradoxical. And some have put forth epistemic principles requiring rational agents to regard their own credences as so-called ‘expert functions’. This paper examines the question of whether rationality requires agents to respect their own credences in a way in which they need not respect the credences of others.