Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 2 June 2008 at 4:15 pm.
XIII—Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View
Version of Record online: 27 OCT 2008
© 2008 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
Volume 108, Issue 1pt3, pages 241–268, October 2008
How to Cite
Proust, J. (2008), XIII—Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 108: 241–268. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2008.00245.x
- Issue online: 27 OCT 2008
- Version of Record online: 27 OCT 2008
Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A ‘brain in the lab’ thought experiment suggests that an internalist view of epistemic feelings is unable to account for the contrast between norm-tracking, educated sentiments, and illusory feelings.